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What is the relationship between the corporation and American democ-
racy? This provocative and timely question informs the ten essays that
Naomi R. Lamoreaux and William J. Novak have assembled in a
tightly edited volume that has attracted a good deal of attention from
specialists in the history of U.S. public policy. In an age in which the
political influence of big business has once again thrust itself onto the
political agenda, this collection should also prove to be of great interest
to the many historians, legal scholars, and jurists who are trying to
understand the long and complex relationship between business, law,
and the state.
For readers of this journal, this collection breaks new ground. For
many decades, historians of the corporation rarely paid more than fleet-
ing attention to its relationship to democracy. Like John F. Kennedy,
who famously reminded critics of prodevelopmental economic policies
that “a rising tide lifts all boats,” they were inclined to assume that if cor-
porations guaranteed material abundance, there was small cause for
concern. Their research agenda instead focused on the internal dynamics
of the firm, a decision that owed much to their frustration with, and in
some instances outright hostility toward, the intellectual orientation of
an earlier generation of progressive historians, whose insistent critique
of big business shaped much historical writing in the mid-twentieth
century and remains very much alive—often, one might add, with good
reason—in the academy today.
It would be a mistake to lump together business historians as oppo-
nents of the democratic impulse that galvanized Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
New Deal. Even so, like the economist Joseph Schumpeter—or, for that
matter, the raft of historians, social theorists, and jurists who witnessed
firsthand the crisis of parliamentary democracy in 1930s Europe—
business historians have been far more inclined than specialists in
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social, cultural, or political history to raise skeptical questions about the
long-term significance of elections, presidential administrations, and
social movements.1 This was true even of Alfred D. Chandler Jr.,
despite his indebtedness to the conceptual framework that he inherited
from the prodemocratic progressive historians Charles Beard and Fred-
erick Jackson Turner.2 Chandler’s Visible Hand, for example, closed
with the candid acknowledgment that the rise of the managerial enter-
prise posed a basic challenge to conventional ideas about democratic
governance in the United States, without proposing how this challenge
could be met.3
The neglect of democracy by business historians has not gone unno-
ticed. For many years, for example, Chandler’s Harvard Business School
colleague David A. Moss has taught classes on the history of American
democracy both at Harvard and in the public schools. Moss is founder
of the Tobin Project, a think tank based in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
that is dedicated to generating policy-relevant scholarship on topics in
the history of American democracy. Among the projects it has sponsored
is the collaboration that led to this volume. ThoughMoss did not contribute
an essay to Corporations and American Democracy, his long-standing
commitment to the study of democracy has helped give this collection a
coherence that is often lacking in projects of this kind.
The Tobin Project takes its inspiration from the conviction of Nobel
Prize–winning economist James Tobin that “outstanding scholarship on
important questions can make a profound difference in society” (p. vii).
For the contributors to this volume, these questions include recent
trends in jurisprudence—such as, in particular, their palpable outrage
at the recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission (2010) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores
1 For an unusually astute analysis of the problem of democratic governance in the 1930s
that remains too little known among nonspecialists in legal history, see Edward A. Purcell
Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexing-
ton, KY, 1973).
2 Richard R. John, “Turner, Beard, Chandler: Progressive Historians,” Business History
Review 82, no. 2 (2008): 227–40.
3 The final sentences of Chandler’s Visible Hand point toward the relevance of business
history for democratic governance, while leaving it to others to figure out how this challenge
might be met. “Such studies,” Chandler observed—in referring to future scholarship on the
comparative history of the business enterprise that focused, as in The Visible Hand he had
not, on the influence on the business enterprise of cultural attitudes, values, ideologies, polit-
ical systems, and the social structure—can help us answer “a critical issue of modern times,”
that is, how the “narrowly trained managers” who “must administer the processes of produc-
tion and distribution in complex modern economies” could be “made responsible for their
actions—actions that have far-reaching consequences.” Chandler, The Visible Hand: TheMan-
agerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA, 1977), 500.
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(2014).4 Indeed, in certain ways, Corporations and American Democ-
racy reads like a professorial critique of the misuse of history by some
of the nation’s most prominent judges, an academic complement, as it
were, to the widespread—and, it should be underscored, easily over-
stated—assumption among political progressives that these rulings
have invested corporations with the same civil rights as the American
people.5 “Corporations are not people” is a seductive rallying cry for
critics of the ideological orientation of today’s Supreme Court. But it is
a misleading gloss of corporate law—past or present—and the contribu-
tors to this collection try to explain why.
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby each expanded the prerogatives
that corporations enjoy under the federal Constitution. Citizens United
overruled a 2002 statutory limit on campaign spending by contending
that this restriction violated the corporation’s First Amendment free-
speech rights, a holding that would henceforth permit any business or
labor union to spend an unlimited sum of money on federal elections,
so long as they did not earmark their contribution for a specific cam-
paign. Hobby Lobby struck down a provision of a 1993 federal law
that required the owners of a closely held corporation to provide their
employees with certain health care benefits by contending that this pro-
vision violated the owners’ First Amendment rights to the “free exercise”
of religion.
These two rulings, warn Lamoreaux and Novak in a bracing
introductory essay, mark a “radical break” in American jurisprudence
(p. 5). Human beings, Lamoreaux elaborates later in the volume—in
an essay coauthored with Ruth H. Bloch—have under the U.S. Constitu-
tion historically enjoyed rights to both liberty and property, while corpo-
rations have enjoyed only property rights. Yet as a result of the Supreme
Court’s recent “aggressive and unprecedented assertion of corporate
rights and authority,” Lamoreaux and Novak contend in their introduc-
tion, this critical distinction has been blurred, overturning “two centuries
of history” and sending the “relationship between corporation and
American democracy reeling off in a new direction” (p. 5). This is danger-
ous, in their view, because corporations have historically been held to a
“higher standard of public care, public responsibility, and public
accountability” than human beings (p. 4). By investing corporations
4Twentieth-century state court rulings receive much less attention, even though they
remain influential in corporate law, because in the United States, corporations are chartered
by the states and not by the federal government.
5 For a spirited, bracing, and morally engaged overview of the present-day debate over cor-
porate civil rights, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Company Men,” New Republic, Apr. 2018, 49–53.
Phillips-Fein’s article is a review of a recent book by Adam Winkler, one of the contributors
to the Lamoreaux-Novak collection.
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with rights, the Supreme Court has paradoxically lowered the threshold
against which their conduct can be judged by lawmakers, jurists, and
citizens.
Had this collection confined itself to providing a scholarly update on
the use and misuse of history by the Supreme Court, this would itself
have been a notable achievement. Yet Corporations and American
Democracy also aspires to offer up a full-scale history of the relationship
of the corporation to democracy in the American past. Central to this
relationship is the premise, set forth most clearly in a preface written
by the Tobin Project’s (unnamed) sponsors, that from the eighteenth
century to the present, corporations have been “created and regulated”
to “address” the “recurring challenges of democracy” (p. vii). By
framing the issue in this way, the Tobin Project sponsors identify corpo-
rations with democracy much more closely than is customary in U.S.
history textbooks—let alone in themassmedia.Whether the relationship
between the corporation and democracy will emerge as the “next new
thing” in American historiography remains to be seen. Yet the contribu-
tors are to be commended for putting this issue high on historians’
agenda and, in so doing, offering up a progressive alternative to the
steady stream of books and articles in the “history of capitalism” genre
that risk confining the field’s ambit to the (undeniably important)
single topic of the exploitation of unfree labor.
How can one generalize about the corporation in the abstract? Busi-
ness historians often restrict themselves to giant organizations such as
the Bank of the United States, Standard Oil, or General Motors. Yet
these behemoths are hardly representative. Some 4.5 million corpora-
tions exist in the United States today. Of these, some are large, the
vast majority small, and the majority nonprofits. Given this variety, it
can be perilous to generalize about their structure, conduct, and perfor-
mance. Sensitive to this objection, economic historians respond by gen-
eralizing about the formal attributes of corporate charters, while law
professors trace legal norms. Of the ten substantive essays here, only
Nelson Lichtenstein’s analysis of Walmart’s business strategy takes as
its defining problematique the social consequences of the managerial
strategy of a single firm. Building directly on the time-honored internal-
ism of Chandlerian business history, Lichtenstein demonstrates its
radical potential—a potential that is largely absent from the other
essays in the collection, which rarely stray far from the unquestionably
consequential, yet ultimately more narrowly defined, realms of institu-
tional forms and legal norms.
Democracy poses an even greater interpretative challenge. Democ-
racy is notoriously hard to define and the contributors are mostly
content to sidestep the issue. For some, democracy is a principled
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aversion to special privilege; for others, it is the public declaration by
lawmakers, jurists, and the writers of legal tracts that corporations
have a social responsibility to promote the public good. For still others,
it is the promulgation of legal norms that empower journalists to
report on public affairs and voluntary associations to champion the
weak and the powerless. Only by implication is democracy understood
—as it had been, for example, by the twentieth-century philosopher
John Dewey—as a mode of self-rule that is open ended, future oriented,
and participatory.
It is of course unfair to fault a project for a lack of clarity on such a
notoriously vexed issue. Even so, would-be readers should be aware that
there remain otherways to relate the corporation to democracy.None of the
contributors, for example, has honed in specifically on the character and
significance of corporate environmental regulation, the mid-twentieth-
century “industrial democracy” movement to increase labor participation
on the factory floor, or the ongoing campaign inside and outside of the
boardroom to overcome the long legacy of workplace discrimination
against women and minorities. And only Lichtenstein speculates directly
about the antidemocratic implications of corporate speech, contending
that it is likely to be less consequential than the erosion of directmanagerial
control over supply chainmanagement. If you are looking for a book on the
legacy of OccupyWall Street or the machinations of the Koch brothers, you
have plenty of options. But you will not find these topics discussed here.
Corporations and American Democracy is, instead, a well-
researched and forcefully argued history of the institutional forms and
legal norms that have shaped the corporation in the United States
from the colonial era to the present, an indispensable perspective that
is particularly well suited to the collaborative research agenda that is
the centerpiece of the Tobin Project’s mission and that has created an
impressive body of knowledge that should help to orient future research
on the relationship of political structure, business strategy, and the
public good.
Corporations and the Law
In the first substantive essay, Eric Hilt challenges the contention of
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia that the only corporations that
concerned the eighteenth-century founders were the tiny number that
lawmakers had granted legally sanctioned monopolies, rather than the
much larger number that had been granted special privileges of
various kinds. Every corporation in this period received a special
charter, typically from a state legislature. For this reason, the founders
found all corporations troubling. This was because every corporation,
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by virtue of its special charter, had been granted certain special privi-
leges. In Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Adolf
H. Berle and Gardiner C. Means wrote approvingly of special-charter
corporations, on the grounds that their special charters demonstrated
that state legislators were effectively regulating them to promote the
public good; for Hilt, in contrast, special charters were almost always a
pernicious legal device that entrenched incumbents, blocked new
entrants, and fostered political corruption.
The mid-nineteenth-century shift from special charters to general
incorporation is the theme of the essay by Jessica L. Hennessey and
John Joseph Wallis. General incorporation—that is, the granting of a cor-
porate charter to any promoterswhomet a very basic set of requirements—
was in their view an epochal innovation that would, as Lamoreaux and
Novak put it in their introduction, hasten a “fundamental restructuring”
of the “workings of American democracy” (p. 13). By making it easier to
incorporate, these laws lifted barriers to entry that had limited economic
opportunity in the special-charter era. By limiting lawmakers, democracy
prevailed: “General incorporation laws were not designed to tie the
hands of the corporations, they were designed to tie the hands of the legis-
lators” (p. 85). Just as the movement for general incorporation was demo-
cratic, so too was its legacy. In fact, the “whole ecology of organizations”
that general incorporation created and sustained was “structured” to
“support a viable and vibrant democracy,” making general incorporation
—or what an earlier generation of historians called “laissez faire”—a “fun-
damental support for American democracy” (pp. 77, 97).6
TheHennessey-Wallis essay illustrates the possibilities, and the lim-
itations, of the contributors’ understanding of democracy. General incor-
poration is democratic not only because it was enacted, but also because
it substituted market competition for political fiat. Nowhere discussed,
however, is the failure of general incorporation laws to fulfill the lofty
expectations with which they had been invested. In the case of the
nineteenth-century telegraph business, for example—a case study well
known to contemporaries, yet one that none of the contributors consider
in any detail—general incorporation would backfire in the most spectac-
ular way, leading in just over three decades to the takeover of the coun-
try’s dominant telegraph network provider by the nineteenth century’s
most notorious financier.7
6Ronald E. Seavoy, “Laissez-Faire: Business Policy, Corporations, and Capital Investment
in the Early National Period,” in Encyclopedia of American Political History, vol. 2, ed. Jack
P. Greene (New York, 1984), 728–37.
7 The notorious propensity of the self-professed antimonopolist telegraph promoter Jay
Gould to manipulate the political process to buttress his prerogatives raises serious questions
about the sweeping contention by Hennessey and Wallis that general incorporation regimes
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The corporate merger movement of 1895 to 1904 exacerbated the
long-standing mismatch between the legal domicile of the corporation,
which with a few exceptions remained an individual state, and the geo-
graphical scale on which the corporation operated, which was increas-
ingly nationwide and even global. As the organizational capabilities of
the corporation increasingly burst the boundaries of the states, state leg-
islatures found it increasingly difficult to hold them accountable to the
public good.
One proposed solution, nicely documented by Daniel A. Crane, was
the proposed enactment of federal legislation requiring corporations to
obtain some kind of a federal license. Two quite different proposals for
incorporation were seriously debated. The first debate occurred in the
1900s during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909), the
second in the 1930s during the New Deal. Though neither of these pro-
posals succeeded, the fact that they had been seriously debated reveals
a continuing democratic distrust of the corporation by influential law-
makers from both of the two major political parties.
While federal licensing failed, the related “public utility idea” proved
to be a spectacular success. Championed in the early twentieth century
by legal treatise writer Bruce Wyman and law professor Felix Frank-
furter, this legal norm would help structure economic activity in
several sectors, including communications, transportation, and energy.
In his chapter, Novak traces the origins of the public utility concept
back to the early nineteenth century, with a special focus on the jurispru-
dence spawned byMunn v. Illinois (1877). Public utility presupposed the
social control of economic activity by government officials, an outcome
that for Novak is the quintessence of the public good, making it “one
of the most important Progressive innovations in the democratic
control of the American corporation” (p. 176).
Somewhat puzzlingly, since, if anything, it would reinforce his
emphasis on the importance of the “public utility idea,” Novak devotes
little attention to the municipal franchise corporation—the very organi-
zations that would help to popularize “public utility” as a stand-alone
noun in the wake of the Panic of 1893 and that in the opening years of
the twentieth century were the quintessential public utilities.8 The
are less prone to corruption than special charter regimes. Richard R. John, Network Nation:
Inventing American Telecommunications (Cambridge,MA, 2010), chap. 5. Indeed, their claim
has a discernible affinity with the avowedly antidemocratic critique of government regulation
of the “public choice” economist James M. Buchanan that is the subject of Nancy MacLean’s
Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America
(New York, 2017).
8On the evolution of the municipal franchise corporation, a theme neglected in this collec-
tion, see John, Network Nation, chap. 7, esp. 216–18, 267.
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laws regulating municipal franchise corporations had never presup-
posed open access, making them an important exception to the corpora-
tions chartered under general incorporation laws—a legal innovation
that not only Novak but also Hilt and Hennessey and Wallis regard as
so critical to the democratization of the American corporation. For this
reason, the history of these laws complicates Novak’s “Road from
Munn” narrative by emphasizing an alternative genealogy of the
“public utility idea” that foregrounded a category of special-charter cor-
porations in which open access had never been presumed and that had
been subject from the outset to more or less continuous regulatory
oversight.9
Progressive taxation was another expedient that lawmakers relied
on to reign in corporate power. In the immediate aftermath of the
great merger movement, as Steven A. Bank and Ajay K. Mehrotra dem-
onstrate in their chapter, even sober-minded promoters took it for
granted that the speculative manipulation of corporate securities had
reached a fever pitch. By enacting tax legislation penalizing speculation,
lawmakers strove to institutionalize the widespread egalitarian hostility
toward corporate power.
Historians often posit a fundamental distinction between business
and philanthropy. In recent decades, however, as Jonathan Levy con-
tends in his chapter on the “fiscal triangle” between for-profit corpora-
tions, nonprofit corporations, and the government, this distinction has
been stripped of much of its meaning. No longer do legal scholars—or,
evenmore significantly, jurists—blithely assume that government corpo-
rate regulation promotes the public good. On the contrary, both for-
profit and nonprofit corporations have been re-envisioned as a nexus
of contracts to promote the interests of shareholders, a shift that helps
to explain the sensitivity toward shareholder rights in Hobby Lobby
and the blurring of the distinction between for-profit and nonprofit cor-
porations in Citizens United.
The legal evolution of corporate rights over the entire course of
American history furnishes the theme for the chapter by Margaret
M. Blair and Elizabeth Pollman. Taking the long view, and building on
a large body of scholarship in legal history that deserves to be better
known outside of this field, Blair and Pollman contend that the rights
that jurists had historically invested in corporations—such as, for
example, the rights of personhood that the Supreme Court granted the
Southern Pacific railroad in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad (1888)—rested not in the corporation as a person but instead
in the identity, or person, of the corporation’s shareholders, who were,
9 John, chap. 7, esp. 267–68.
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at the time, almost always a relatively small number of people.10 The
Hobby Lobby ruling for this reason marks in their view a dramatic
break with legal precedent, since—though its defendant was also a
closely held corporation—it “dismantled” the “basic framework laid
down more than a century ago of recognizing corporate rights only
when it is necessary to protect the rights of human persons represented
by the corporation” (p. 285).
To underscore the novelty of Hobby Lobby and Citizens United,
Bloch and Lamoreaux chart in their chapter the evolution of two very dif-
ferent kinds of corporate rights: property rights and liberty rights. Build-
ing on several generations of legal scholarship, they underscore that the
“conventional wisdom” among nonspecialists regarding Santa Clara—
that is, the ruling that granted corporations the same civil rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment as individuals—was mistaken: “Liberty
rights, as distinct from property rights, belonged only to humans”
(p. 287). Santa Clara safeguarded the property rights of the Southern
Pacific railroad, but declined to grant the railroad First Amendment
(“liberty”) rights. In contrast, Hobby Lobby and Citizens United
collapsed this distinction: “The idea that corporations have First
Amendment rights is a recent invention” (p. 289).
Lichtenstein shifts the focus in his chapter from corporate law to cor-
porate practice. In April 2013, a fire at a garment factory complex near
Dhaka, Bangladesh, killed 1,124 people. How, he asks, can catastrophes
like this be explained? Who should be held accountable? Much of the
answer can be found in the rise of an international corporate legal
regime to facilitate global supply chain management—a business tech-
nique that has permitted corporations like Walmart to rely increasingly
on intermediaries to match supply and demand. In so doing, legal norms
made it harder for workers to collectively bargain to boost their working
conditions and living standards. The Chandlerian vertically integrated
corporation was, in short, more supportive of proworker regulation
than the “distended sourcing strategies and fissured employment
regimes” that have supplanted it (p. 357). By facilitating the vertical dis-
integration of supply chain management, present-day corporate legal
norms have undermined an organizational mechanism that had pro-
moted the empowerment of some of the world’s most vulnerable
workers.
10 For a related discussion that puts the issue of corporate personhood in its late nine-
teenth-century intellectual milieu, see Gregory A. Mark, “The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law,” University of Chicago Law Review 54 (1987): 1441–83. For
Mark’s critique of the Hobby Lobby ruling, see Mark, “Hobby Lobby and Corporate Person-
hood: Taking the U.S. Supreme Court’s Reasoning at Face Value,” DePaul Law Review 65
(Winter 2016): 535–58.
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Several of the contributors to Corporations and American Democ-
racy emphasize the novelty of the Supreme Court rulings in Hobby
Lobby and Citizens United. For AdamWinkler, however, this contention
is not only highly misleading but also potentially reactionary. By recon-
structing the precedents on which the Supreme Court relied in rendering
its verdicts—a topic he explores in more detail in his recent book,We the
Corporations:HowAmericanBusinessesWonTheir Civil Rights (2018)—
Winkler concludes that these rulings rest on a string of precedents, making
them far less anomalous than several of the other contributors to this col-
lection assert. Hobby Lobby hinged on a particular reading of statutory
law, Citizens United on a concept of corporate personhood that valorized
the rights not of the creator of controversial content but of its audience.
To contend otherwise—by, say, enacting a constitutional amendment
that would strip corporations of rights, as certain present-day progressives
have proposed—might well leave media outlets like, for example, the
New York Times unable to defend their First Amendment free-expression
rights should a hostile party such as, for example, a government official try
to assail their prerogatives in the courts.
Conclusions
While the contributors to Corporations and American Democracy
do not speak with a single voice, several conclusions emerge. First, the
“birth or origin” of government corporate regulation in the United
States long antedated the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act
in 1887 and the Federal Antitrust Act in 1890 (p. 15). By 1887, the regu-
lation of the corporation on the basis of the public interest had already
become a “dominant feature of American economic and political
history” (p. 16). Second, corporations have historically been enormously
varied, raising questions about the wisdom of designing legal norms that
treat them as if they were all alike. Third, the social control of corpora-
tions is a democratic imperative that has promoted, and can promote,
the public good. To be sure, neither Hilt nor Hennessey and Wallis nor
even Novak provides corporation-specific case studies to buttress this
eminently plausible claim, and Crane documents a regulatory project
that failed. Even so, most of the contributors equate government regula-
tion with democracy and lament the recent challenges to government
regulation hastened by the broadening of corporate rights. There is
little in this collection, in short, to warm the hearts of libertarians;
indeed, large portions read like a paean to the still-unfulfilled promise
of the Democratic Party’s midcentury New Deal.
Here lies a certain tension in the collection. In the period between
1790 and 1840, some Americans criticized the government regulation
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of corporations as corrupt and praised general incorporation as demo-
cratic. In the early twentieth century, other Americans hailed the govern-
ment regulation of corporations as a salutary constraint upon a
rapacious plutocracy. Were either or both of these movements demo-
cratic? If so, how would we know?
Even more basic questions are raised by the enormous significance
with which the contributors have invested recent Supreme Court
rulings. Will future generations share the conviction that Hobby
Lobby and Citizens United should be treated with the kind of moral
disdain that historians today reserve for Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)
and Plessy v. Ferguson (1892)? Or, alternatively, might not future gen-
erations fault today’s historians for exaggerating their novelty—and, in
the process, inadvertently weakening democratic constraints on corpo-
rate power—just as a prior generation had popularized a misleading
view of corporate personhood by overstating the novelty of Santa
Clara. It has taken generations for legal historians to debunk the mis-
taken idea that early twentieth-century U.S. jurisprudence was defined
by the antiregulatory animus of Lochner v. New York (1905). It would
be an unfortunate irony if Corporations and American Democracy con-
tributed to an equally misleading reading of present-day jurisprudence
by unintentionally inflating the significance of Hobby Lobby and
Citizens United.11
None of these questions is meant to detract from the merits of this
volume. Carefully planned, intelligently edited, and forcefully argued,
Corporations and American Democracy is a valuable addition to an
emerging revisionist literature in business history, political history,
and legal studies and is a testament to a successful interdisciplinary col-
laboration that showcases the intellectual rewards of tapping specialists
from different fields to tackle big questions about issues of contemporary
concern.
Richard R. John is professor of history and communications at Columbia
University. His publications include Network Nation: Inventing American
Telecommunications (2010), which was awarded the Ralph E. Gomory
Prize by the Business History Conference. He is currently writing a history
of the antimonopoly tradition in the United States, for which he was
awarded a Guggenheim Foundation fellowship in 2019.
11 In their introduction, Lamoreaux andNovak rightly deplore the “persistentmyths” about
the “so-called ‘Gilded Age’” and the Lochner era—catchphrases that have distracted historians
from exploring the continued expansion in the period from 1877 to 1920 of the “regulatory
impulse to assert democratic control over newly expansive forms of corporate power and con-
centration” (p. 17). It is to be hoped that the journalistic hyping of Hobby Lobby and Citizens
United will not lead to a similar misreading of the present moment in U.S. political history.
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